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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Air has no Residence, no Neighbor, 
No Ear, no Door, 
No Apprehension of Another 
Oh, Happy Air! 
 
Ethereal Guest at e’en an Outcast’s Pillow — 
Essential Host, in Life’s fain, wailing Inn, 
Later than Light thy Consciousness accost me 
Till it depart, persuading Mine —1 
 
In her poem, Emily Dickinson captures the mysteries of that 
fundamental element of life that constantly surrounds us: air.  Along 
with water, air is indeed life’s “essential host.”  It is precisely this 
feature that requires our society to take actions toward monitoring 
and protecting its quality, both for ourselves and future generations.  
Dickinson’s poem also speaks directly to the trait which stands as the 
most challenging obstacle to regulating air pollution.  Air truly does 
have “no residence, no neighbor.”  It passes across borders 
effortlessly, and it is this ambient quality of air that motivates states 
to seek action against others on behalf of their citizens.  This same 
need, however, also suggests the necessity and importance of 
uniform federal air pollution standards.  
With the proliferation of scientific studies into climate change 
and greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution stands today as an 
increasingly important and controversial political, economic, and 
social issue.  In the modern era, concern has grown not only to 
regulate pollution locally, but to protect citizens from emissions that 
                                                          
*Erica Bourdon is a second year student at Pepperdine University School 
of Law. Erica graduated from the University of California at Irvine with a Bachelor 
of Arts in Literary Journalism. This article would not have been possible without 
the help of the wonderful NAALJ editors, most especially Elaine Ekpo. She would 
also like to thank her father, for sharing his love of the environment and outdoors 
which inspired this note and her fiance, Dan, for his continued love, support, and 
grilled cheese sandwiches while she was writing.  
 
1 EMILY DICKINSON, THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON, 483 
(Thomas H. Johnson, ed., 1976).  
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originate elsewhere and have adverse effects on a national or global 
scale.   
In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,2 the Supreme 
Court takes up the issue of air pollution regulation and wrestles with 
the question of whether individual states may bring suit in order to 
abate greenhouse gas emissions emanating from stationary sources3 
located in other states.  This lawsuit constitutes “a new breed of 
environmental enforcement, brought on by governmental officials 
that are separate from the agencies historically delegated with 
authority and empowered with expertise and resources to address 
environmental issues.”4  The states brought suit on two separate 
theories of nuisance—first, a state tort theory and second, a theory 
based on federal common law.5  Proponents of upholding the federal 
common law claim argue that “Americans deserve to be protected by 
the old and reliable common law when the vicissitudes of politics 
prevent competent protection.”6  They view the federal common law 
nuisance claim as a way to “prod” Congress or the administrative 
agency into action, arguing: 
 
Just as the existence of divided and overlapping 
government authorities creates opportunities for those 
institutions to check and balance one another’s 
overreaches, it also opens space for them to prod and 
plead with one another when the danger instead is one 
of government underreach.7  
                                                          
2 American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).  
3 “Stationary source” is a term of art defined as “any building, structure, 
facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.”  42 U.S.C. § 
7411(a)(2) (2006).  For example, a coal-fired power plant would be considered a 
stationary source, whereas an automobile would be considered a mobile source.  
These two types of sources fall under different regulatory schemes.  See e.g. 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
4 KEVIN A. EWING, JASON B. HUTT, & ERIK E. PETERSEN, Enforcement 
and Liability, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 67, 127 (19th ed. 2007).  
5 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534.  
6 John Wood, Easier Said Than Done: Displacing Public Nuisance When 
States Sue for Climate Change Damages, 41 ENVTL. LAW REP. 10316, 10325 (Apr. 
2011).  
7  Benjamin Ewing and Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited 
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2012) 
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The interplay here between administrative agencies and federal 
common law has far reaching consequences both in environmental 
and administrative law.  Where the Court’s decision in the present 
case may be viewed on the one-hand as weakening state’s ability to 
implement environmental laws by effectively eliminating one arrow 
in their quiver of enforcement, it may also be seen as strengthening 
or reinforcing the power of administrative agencies.  
To reach their decision in American Electric Power Co., the 
Court closely followed its previous analysis of the Clean Water Act.  
After splitting 4-4 on the issue of standing,8 the Court proceeded to 
                                                          
(Yale Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 224).  Ewing and Kysar argue 
that these tort theories of litigation and the availability of federal common law 
claims to litigants serves as a system of “prods and pleas” counter to the system of 
“checks and balances.”  Id.  While checks and balances work in the federal system 
to limit the activities of the different branches of government, this “prods and 
pleas” system would, according to the theory they present, work as a way for 
different sections of the government to “push each other to action when changing 
social conditions require it . . .”  Id.  They assert that “courts and other 
governmental institutions should see calls for prodding and pleading not as 
redundant and overreaching, but rather as structurally necessitated; not as 
ahistorical or unoriginalist, but rather in keeping with the highest ideals and 
aspirations of the Founders themselves.”  Id.  According to this principle, the suit 
would act as a way to push the EPA into action where necessary according to the 
states.  Perhaps the Court in the present case felt that the settlement agreement 
previously issued sufficiently served that purpose.  
The authors recognize the special significance of these types of cases concerning 
the welfare of the public-at-large saying:  
 
The concern over third parties not before the court is particular to 
the administrative law context, where courts are keen to avoid the 
prospect of citizens using the power of judicial review to address 
policy issues in the abstract or to pursue some generalized interest 
in the proper administration of the law.  This concern has less 
bearing in the common law context as it is the judicial branch 
itself that shapes and administers the relevant body of law. 
 
Id.  Essentially, what the authors are saying here is that because courts themselves 
administer the common law, they are less hesitant to make rulings, whereas when 
administrative law is involved, it is an agency rather than the court which oversees 
the implementation of the law and therefore, the courts are reluctant to place their 
own perspectives on the subject.  This is the public policy concept behind 
displacement.  
8 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
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the merits of the case and its interpretation turns on Congress’s 
delegation of rulemaking to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).9  The Court concluded that regulating emissions requires an 
“informed assessment of competing interests” and that “[t]he Clean 
Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA . . . ,” rather than 
federal judges who are without the “scientific, economic, and 
technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of 
this order.”10  Displacement of federal law occurs when a federal 
statute or administrative agency regulation “governs a question 
previously the subject of Federal common law.”11  Displacement may 
be distinguished from preemption, which requires evidence of a 
“clear and manifest purpose” by Congress to override a state law, 
because it does not implicate the same concerns over the separation 
of powers between the states and federal government inherent in our 
federalist system.12  Based on this doctrine of displacement, the 
Court’s ruling shrinks the realm of federal common law even further 
to essentially eliminate it entirely, but does not reach the question of 
preemption of the state tort law cause of action.13 
Part II of this Note provides the scientific background and 
historical context behind the Court’s ruling.  Understanding this 
decision requires a look not only at the history of federal common 
law and administrative law, but the climate change debate, patterns in 
environmental litigation and the history of the Clean Air Act itself.  
Part III looks at the factual basis and procedural history behind 
American Electric Power Co.  Part IV analyzes the Court’s approach 
to determining the issues of both (A) standing and (B) displacement, 
and Part V discusses the impact of these determinations.  
Specifically, Part V emphasizes the role of the Court’s decision on 
administrative agencies and administrative law judges.  Finally, in 
Part VI, this Note concludes with an assertion that the displacement 
of federal common law places an even greater responsibility on 
administrative agencies to protect our health and welfare, particularly 
our environment.   
                                                          
9 Id. at 2538. 
10 Id. at 2539-40.  
11 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981).  
12 Id. at 316-17.  
13  American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.  
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II.  BACKGROUND 
 
  A.  Climate Change 
 
Greenhouse gases are those gases that trap heat in the Earth’s 
atmosphere.14  Carbon dioxide (CO2) is a greenhouse gas that occurs 
both naturally in the atmosphere and as a result of human processes, 
including the burning of fossil fuels and chemical reactions that take 
place during certain production processes like the manufacturing of 
cement.15  During a natural carbon cycle, the amount of CO2 emitted 
into the atmosphere roughly cancels out the amount absorbed back 
into the atmosphere or oceans.16  The exponential increase in human 
activities such as deforestation and the burning of fossil fuels—oil, 
coal, and gas—that has taken place since the Industrial Revolution 
has caused the concentration of CO2 in the Earth’s atmosphere to 
                                                          
14 Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Climate Change - Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 20, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/index.html.  See generally Science, 
Climate Change – Science, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/index.html.  Greenhouse gases occur 
naturally in the atmosphere and allow solar radiation from the sun to remain within 
our atmosphere, heating the Earth.  Id. Without the greenhouse effect, 
“temperatures would be about 60ºF lower than they are now, and life as we know it 
today would not be possible.”  Id.  The principal greenhouse gases emitted through 
human activity are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
the fluorinated gases (also called “F-gases” or high global warming potential gases) 
which includes hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride. Id.   
15 See Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 14.  The four principal 
greenhouse gases which occur both naturally and through human processes are 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and flourinated gases (hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride).  Id. 
16 Natural Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, Climate Change - 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_natural.html. A natural carbon 
cycle involves the exchange of carbon dioxide between sources and sinks.  Id.  
Sources include animal and plant respiration and volcanic eruptions, which 
naturally admit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.  Id.  Sinks, such as plant 
photosynthesis or oceans, then take in this carbon dioxide and continues the natural 
cycle.  Id.  When this cycle works in balance, the total emission from sources and 
the absorption from sinks is roughly equal.  Id.  
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greatly increase.17  The natural sinks that remove carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere are out paced by the increased emission into the 
atmosphere.18  This increased concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the Earth’s atmosphere results in the phenomenon known as climate 
change or global warming.19  
Research and debate about climate change began over a 
century ago when scientist Joseph Fourier first hypothesized that the 
earth’s atmosphere traps heat radiation.20  Despite Fourier’s early 
research, it was not until 1859 that John Tyndall confirmed the 
existence of greenhouse gases by discovering that CO2 in the 
atmosphere does block heat radiation.21  Much of this early scientific 
hypothesis and research into climate changes resulted from the study 
of ice ages, including Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius’ 
calculations of the amount of CO2 necessary to significantly lower or 
raise the global temperature.22  Numerous news reports as early as the 
1920’s and 1930’s (particularly from the Arctic) claimed 
temperatures were rising.23  In 1957, Roger Revelle, an ocean 
chemist, and Hans Suess, a chemist and nuclear physicist, published 
a paper overturning the long-held belief that the oceans absorbed the 
                                                          
17 Id.  According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the 
concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere had expanded by 35% in 
2005 since the Industrial Revolution of the 1700’s.   
18 See U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory, Climate Change - Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usgginventory.html. 
19 See Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_re
port_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm.  
20 Thomas Lin, Andrew C. Revkin, Jeff Roth, Lisa Tarchak and Spencer 
Weart, Science and Politics of Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/12/07/science/20091207_CLIMATE_TI
MELINE.html.  Fourier made this hypothesis based on the study of ancient ice and 
analogized his theory of how the earth retains heat radiation to “a box with a glass 
cover.”  Id.  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  In 1896, Arrhenius believed that with the rate of emissions from 
coal burning in the 1890’s, the effects of climate change would likely not be felt for 
centuries.  Id. 
23 Id. 
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excess CO2 being emitted.
24  Their landmark paper, “regarded as the 
opening shot in the global warming debates,” asserted that the oceans 
could not absorb CO2 at the same pace as humans were emitting it 
into the atmosphere.25  In the 1960’s, Suess linked this excess 
emission of CO2 to fossil fuels.
26  
Just as the study of ice ages sparked the initial inquiries into 
climate change, it also ignited controversy, particularly in the early 
1960’s.  In 1966, studies of core samples drilled from the sea bed and 
ancient coral reefs offered concrete evidence that the ice ages 
resulted from changes in Earth’s orbit rather than greenhouse gases.27  
However, scientists continued to study the effects of increased 
greenhouse gas emissions on temperature and weather patterns.28  
Growing concern for the environment and a lack of understanding 
and consensus around air and water pollution led President Richard 
Nixon to create the EPA in 1970.29  Debate continued, with the EPA 
                                                          
24 Id.  
25 Lin, supra note 20.  
26 Id. 
27 Id.  Edward Lorenz suggested the possibility that “trivial astronomical 
shifts” to the orbit of Earth may have brought on the ice ages.  Id.  Lorenz believed 
that even the slightest change could have catastrophic effects on the climate.  Id.  
Shortly thereafter, on February 11, 1968, in an effort to better understand global 
weather patterns and our planet’s history, scientists drilled 7,111 feet into the ice 
beneath Antarctica.  Id.  The following year, the Nimbus 3 Satellite launched into 
orbit to study and measure atmospheric temperatures.  Id.  
28 Id.  The early 1970’s witnessed drastic changes in weather patterns 
resulting in droughts and diminished crop production across the globe.  Id.  Climate 
scientist concluded these alterations in weather patterns “posed a severe threat to 
agriculture” and could result in “mass starvation.”  Id.  In 1975, a team of scientists 
headed by Syukuro Manabe applied computer models simulating the rise in 
temperatures resulting from increased amounts of CO2 in the atmosphere.  Id. 
29 James M. Naughton, Nixon Proposes 2 New Agencies on Environment, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1970, at 1.  President Nixon created the agency to combat 
what he saw as “the tendency of statutory departments to allow their resource 
development responsibilities to color their approach to environmental questions.”  
Id. at 14.  He stated that, “‘[b]ecause environmental protection cuts across so many 
jurisdictions, and because arresting environmental deterioration is of great 
importance to the quality of life in our country and the world, I believe that in this 
case a strong, independent agency is needed.’”  Id.  On December 4, 1970, William 
D. Ruckelshaus took office as the first Administrator of the EPA.  See The 
Guardian: Origins of the EPA, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY (Spring 1992), 
http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/publications/print/origins.html.  
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and the National Academy of Sciences publishing conflicting reports 
as to the severity and immediacy of concern over CO2 levels in 
1983.30  Still seeking to reach a better understanding of the issue, the 
international community, including the United States, created the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).31  The decade 
of the 1990’s saw both the juxtaposition of increasing skepticism of 
climate science in favor of economic growth set against ever more 
dire warnings of a need to reduce man’s carbon footprint, particularly 
by the IPCC.32  The new millennium ushered in an era of increased 
media attention, scientific research and public concern over climate 
change, with the international community negotiating treaties to 
regulate emissions (the most well-known being the Kyoto 
Protocol),33 some former skeptics in the scientific community 
acknowledging data supporting climate change,34 and former Vice-
President Al Gore receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts 
against global warming.35  Disagreement has not disappeared, 
                                                          
30 See Lin, supra note 20.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  See also Assessment Reports, IPCC, 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012).  
33 The Kyoto Protocol legally obliges signatory countries in the 
industrialized world to cut emissions of greenhouse gases under international law.  
United Nations, Making those first steps count: An Introduction to the Kyoto 
Protocol, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/6034.php (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2012).  While originally adopted in Japan in 1997, the accord did not take 
effect until 2005.  Id.  It only binds developed countries, not developing nations 
and was never adopted by the United States.  Id.  
34 Perhaps most notably, University of California, Berkeley physicist and 
former global warming skeptic Richard Muller undertook a study of the earth’s 
surface temperature.  Seth Borenstein, Skeptic finds he now agrees global warming 
is real, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/skeptic-finds-now-
agrees-global-warming-real-142616605.html.  Specifically, Muller focused his 
research on “examin[ing] two chief criticisms by skeptics.  One is that weather 
stations are unreliable; the other is that cities, which create heat islands, were 
skewing the temperature analysis.”  Id.  He found a 1.6 degree increase in 
temperatures from the 1950s.  Id.  After undertaking the study, he concluded that 
“Greenhouse gases could have a disastrous impact on the world.”  Id. 
35 In 2007, the Nobel Foundation awarded former vice-president Al Gore 
Jr. and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change the Nobel Peace Prize “for 
their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made 
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however, as the scandal that became known as “climategate36” led 
some to distrust the scientific community and concern for the state of 
the economy led others to call for less governmental regulations in an 
effort to promote industry.37 
 
  B.  Clean Air Act (CAA) 
 
While water pollution had long been considered a federal 
problem, prior to the 1960’s many viewed air pollution as a state or 
local matter.38  At that time, most of the laws regulating air quality 
were nuisance-based state law ordinances.39  States derived the 
ability to regulate environmental pollution through their 
constitutional police powers, which allowed them to take measures in 
order to protect the health and welfare of their citizens; most declined 
                                                          
climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to 
counteract such change.”  The Nobel Peace Prize 2007, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2012). 
36 In November of 2009, hundreds of e-mails and documents hacked from 
a server at the University of East Anglia in Britain caused many to believe climate 
scientists had knowingly and intentionally misled the general public about the level 
of impact of human activities on climate change.  Andrew C. Revkin, Hacked E-
Mail Is New Fodder for Climate Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/21climate.html.  The e-mails 
include discussions between scientists about “using a statistical ‘trick’ in a chart 
illustrating a recent sharp warming trend,” in analysis of tree-ring data and 
thermometer readings.  Id.  One of the scientists implicated in the correspondence, 
Michael Mann of Pennsylvania State University responded to the allegation by 
explaining that “dropping the use of the tree rings was never something that was 
hidden, and had been in the scientific literature for more than a decade.  ‘It sounds 
incriminating, but when you look at what you’re talking about, there’s nothing  
there, . . .’”  Id.  
37 See e.g. William Fulton, Do Environmental Regulations Hurt the 
Economy?, GOVERNING (Mar. 2010), http://www.governing.com/columns/eco-
engines/Do-Environmental-Regulations-Hurt.html.  
38 ARNOLD W. REITZE, STATIONARY SOURCE AIR POLLUTION LAW 5 
(2005).  See also J. Philip Bromberg, How to Comply with the Clean Air Act, in 
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 23 (1983).  In addition to the earlier development of 
technology to monitor and control water pollution, water’s role as a carrier and 
spreader of contagious disease, as well as its use as a pathway of interstate 
commerce landing it within the purview of the Commerce Clause, granted to water 
earlier federal involvement in regulation than air.  Id.   
39 Id. at 6.  
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to exercise this power, however, and in the few states that did, laws 
took the form of local zoning ordinances.40  Most localities directed 
these ordinances primarily against smoke.41  Historically, there has 
                                                          
40 Id. at 6-7.  Hadacheck  v. Sebastian  provides one early example of a 
local attempt to regulate air pollution.  Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 
(1915).  In 1915, the City of Los Angeles encompassed an area of 107.62 square 
miles with 75% devoted to residential use.  Id. at 406.  The city implemented a 
zoning ordinance making it “unlawful for any person to establish or operate a 
brickyard or brickkiln [sic], or any establishment, factory, or place for the 
manufacture or burning of brick within . . .” a three square mile area of the city.  Id. 
at 404, 406.  Plaintiff, Hadacheck, operated a brick making facility on his property 
which rested within the three square miles mentioned in the ordinance.  Id. at 404.  
Defendant, the Los Angeles chief of police, took plaintiff into custody after his 
conviction of a misdemeanor for violating the ordinance.  Id. at 404.  Plaintiff 
asserted the law constituted an unlawful taking of his property without 
compensation and greatly diminished the value of his property in violation of the 
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 407.   Plaintiff appealed the denial 
of his writ of habeas corpus all the way up to the United States Supreme Court, 
who affirmed the findings of the California Supreme Court in upholding the 
validity of the ordinance.  Id. at 414.  The Supreme Court found the exercise of the 
city’s police power valid in prohibiting the burning of bricks as “fumes, gases, 
smoke, soot, steam, and dust arising from petitioner’s brick-making plant have 
from time to time caused sickness and serious discomfort to those living in the 
vicinity.”  Id. at 408.  This case illustrates an early attempt to regulate air quality 
based on concerns for the health of the citizens living in the municipality.   
41 See Bromberg, supra note 38, at 25.  Chicago was the first city to pass 
municipal legislation governing the quality of air in 1881, followed by Cincinnati 
shortly after.  Id. at 26.  Pittsburg passed its first regulations of air quality as early 
as 1985, followed by regulations in the city of Boston in 1901.  Id. at 25. The 
regulation passed by the Board of Health of the City of Boston read in part:  
 
No substance in any way liable to be distributed or blown about 
by wind or air currents shall be sieved, screened, agitated or 
otherwise handled or exposed in any street or public place, nor 
elsewhere in such a manner that particles or portions of such 
substances are scattered, blown or otherwise pass into or upon 
any such street or pubic place or into or upon any inhabited 
buildings. This shall not apply to the delivery of coal, provided 
suitable precautions for dampening are taken . . . No carpets, rugs, 
mats or similar articles shall be . . .  dust particles or portions of 
said articles from being blown, scattered or otherwise passing 
from the place where such beating or cleaning is carried on.  Id.  
 
Oregon was the first state to adopt a comprehensive control on air quality in 1952, 
three years earlier than the first federal legislation on the topic.  Id. at 26.  In many 
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been a strong interplay between land use and environmental 
regulations.42  Over time, and as public concern regarding air quality 
in urban centers grew, some state governments did eventually enact 
comprehensive emission control ordinances before the federal 
government intervened in the regulation of air pollution.43 
The federal government did not play a role in the regulation 
of air pollution until the 1960s, urged on by the proliferation of coal-
burning power plants in response to the growth in population and 
industry after WWII, further hastened on by an environmental 
catastrophe in Donora, Pennsylvania known today as “killer fog.”44  
On October 27, 1948 weather conditions and extreme air pollution 
from the American Steel & Wire Company and the Donora Zinc 
Works (both operated by the U.S. Steel Company) just outside the 
city of Donora, Pennsylvania formed a deadly combination killing 
                                                          
cities during this period, including Los Angeles as it became concerned with the 
growing effects of smog, the municipal agencies’ budgets were larger than that of 
the state agencies. J. Philip Bromberg, How to Comply with the Clean Air Act, in 
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 23, 23-27 (1983).   In 1967, California’s state budget 
for its agency dealing with air quality was $2,400,000 compared to Los Angeles’ 
municipal agency budget of $3,800,000 to address air pollution issues.  Id. at 26. 
42 Id. at 19.   
43 Id. at 8.  See also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: 
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 25-8 (1983).  
44 Bromberg, supra note 38, at 26.  See also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & 
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).  Donora, a Pennsylvania 
town just 37 miles outside of Pittsburgh and situated close to both the Donora Zinc 
Works and U.S. Steel Corp. steel and wire plant, marked the site of one of the 
nation’s most memorable environmental disasters.  Id. at 152.  On October 29th, 
1948, an unusual yellow smog enveloped the town likely caused by extraordinarily 
high concentrations of what subsequent researches have posited to have been 
Sulfur dioxide (SO2).  Id.  As a result of the smog, in addition to the twenty people 
asphyxiated, 43% of the town suffered from some form of adverse health effects.  
Id.  Then in December of 1952, a similar fog descended upon London resulting in 
4,000 deaths in a two-week period.  Id. at 152.  “No pollutant monitors were 
present in Donora during the incident; a single monitoring site in London recorded 
extraordinarily high daily concentrations of SO2 and particulates . . . .  Other 
episodes have occurred in the world’s major cities since 1952, but none has been as 
serious.”  Id. See also 1948 Killer Smog Triggered Pollution Control, 
WWW.DONORASMOG.COM, 
http://www.donorasmog.com/newsarticles_files/article1948killersmog.htm (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2012).  
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twenty people and leaving half the city of 14,000 ill.45  Six days later, 
rain finally came and cleared out the smog.46  Researchers attribute 
the catastrophe to “an unusual weather inversion – a pocket of warm, 
stagnant air – that sat over the valley . . . . Underneath what was 
essentially a lid on the valley were sulfuric acid, nitrogen dioxide and 
other poisonous gases, including fluoride, that would normally rise 
into the atmosphere.”47  The United States Steel Company denied 
responsibility, calling the smog “an act of God.”48  Many credit the 
national attention gained by this environmental disaster as leading to 
the passage of the 1970 Clean Air Act.49  In 2008, the town of 
Donora opened a museum to remember the lives lost in the smog 
with the slogan: “Clean Air Started Here.”50  
Federal involvement in air pollution regulation began with 
passage of a string of several congressional acts and evolved into the 
CAA we have today as administered by the EPA and its 
administrative law judges, and as interpreted by the Supreme Court.51  
                                                          
45 Donora Smog Held Near Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1948, at 
26.  Dr. Mills from the University of Cincinnati oversaw a house-to-house 
canvassing of Donora in the months following the smog in order to collect data in 
an attempt to better understand the catastrophe.  Id.  He reported twenty human 
deaths, as well as over 800 animals killed by the deadly smog.  Id.  “Of the 7,670 
residents now questioned, 3,212 reported serious effects on that ‘fatal’ night; 603 of 
these were treated by physicians and 277 others begged unsuccessfully for such 
aid, many of them receiving treatment from city firemen and Red Cross workers.”  
Id.  Dr. Mills also asserted that many of the residents who did not report any 
negative effects from the smog refused to do so in fear of losing their employment 
at the zinc plant.  Id.  This assertion was disputed by others, however, including the 
president of the Board of Health.  Id.  
46 Sean D. Hamill, Unveiling a Museum, a Pennsylvania Town 
Remembers the Smog That Killed 20, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/us/02smog.html.  
47 Id.  
48 See Donora Smog Held Near Catastrophe, supra note 43. 
49 See Hamill, supra note 46.  
50 Id.  
51 These congressional acts being the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, 
69 Stat. 322, the Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392, and the Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 992.  See Melnick, supra note 43, at 27.   
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While Congress passed the first Clean Air Act in 1963, originally 
administered by the U.S.  Public Health Service,52  
 
Over the past four decades, the [CAA] has evolved 
from a set of principles designed to guide states in 
controlling sources of air pollution . . . to multiple 
levels of pollution control requirements (the 1970, 
1977 and 1990 amendments to the act) that the federal 
government implements by regulations and that the 
states administer and apply.53  
 
The 1990 Amendments significantly impacted the 
implementation of air pollution controls as they shifted the focus 
from a “command-and-control” approach to a “market-control” 
approach.54  It is under this approach that the regulation of emissions 
from stationary sources falls and the issue in the present case arises.  
The 1990 Amendments also provide for permitting and greatly 
expanded the authority of the EPA in regulating air pollution.55  The 
Supreme Court has since interpreted the CAA in several ways, 
including its decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency, discussed infra, where the Court found that “greenhouse 
gases . . . qualify as ‘air pollutants’ within the meaning of the 
governing Clean Air Act provision,” and therefore fall under the 
regulatory authority of the EPA.56 
 
 
                                                          
52 History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Nov. 
16, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caa_history.html.  
53 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 231 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007). 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  The 1990 Amendments to the CAA “[e]stablished permit program 
requirements”, “[e]xpanded and modified provisions concerning the attainment of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards”, “[e]xpanded and modified enforcement 
authority”, and “[e]stablished a program to phase out the use of chemicals that 
deplete the ozone layer.”  History of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Nov. 16, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caa_history.html.  
56 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532-33 (citing Massachusetts 
v. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29).  
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  C.  Environmental Litigation 
 
The difficulties facing respondents in this case come as 
familiar ground in environmental litigation.  Plaintiffs have 
historically struggled to overcome two barriers: the requirements of 
standing and justiciability.57  However, respondents in the present 
case face a third issue, displacement.  This relationship between 
environmental concerns and these areas of the law continues to grow 
and evolve, as illustrated by the present case.   
The Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins58 
disavowed the existence of a federal common law, however, just 
thirty-four years later in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee 
I),59 with Justice Douglas writing for a unanimous court, held, “when 
we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there 
is a federal common law.”60  Milwaukee I went even further in 
speaking to the current issue by stating, “It may happen that new 
federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the 
field of federal common law of nuisance.  But until that comes to 
pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the 
suits alleging creation of a public nuisance . . . .”61  
                                                          
57 Kevin A. Gaynor, Benjamin S. Lippard, and Margaret E. Peloso, 
Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common-Law Climate Change 
Claims, 40 ENVTL. L REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10845 (Sept. 2010).  
58 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  In what began as a 
personal injury suit filed in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, Justice 
Brandeis, writing for the majority, overturned the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 
U.S. 1 (1842), which allowed federal courts deriving jurisdiction from diversity of 
citizenship to exercise independent judgment in interpreting the common law.  
Erie, 304 U.S.  at 71.  Finding the doctrine to have both political and social defects 
in that it “rendered impossible equal protection of the law,” the Supreme Court in 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins declared, “There is no federal general common law.”  Id. 
at 74-78.    
59 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) [hereinafter 
Milwaukee I]. 
60 Id. at 103 (adopting the holding of the tenth circuit in Texas v. Pankey, 
441 F.2d 236 (1971)). 
61 Id. at 107.  While the Court in Milwaukee I dealt specifically with water 
pollution and the application of the tort of public nuisance in that respect, they 
extended the concept to include air quality as well as water quality because of their 
ambient natures.  Id. at 93.    
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Congress saw fit to amend the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act in 1972 and established a new system requiring a permit 
for the discharge of any pollutants into the nation’s waterways.62  The 
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to hear once again the claims 
of Illinois and Michigan against the sewage treatment plants in 
Milwaukee in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan (Milwaukee 
II).63  The Court found these amendments and the delegation of their 
implementation to the EPA disallowed the invocation of federal 
common law as a remedy.64  They clarified their earlier holding in 
Milwaukee I to establish that federal common law may only be 
created if not doing so would deny the plaintiffs any forum in which 
to protect their interests.65  The Court explained its rationale as 
follows: “Not only are the technical problems difficult—doubtless 
the reason Congress vested authority to administer the Act in 
administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise—but the 
general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under 
a regime of federal common law.”66  
The possibility of displacement of federal common law by the 
passage of laws or regulations left open by the Court in Milwaukee I 
and exemplified in Milwaukee II came to fruition with the passage of 
the Clean Air Act of 1970 and the myriad lawsuits accompanying 
it.67  After Congress amended the CAA in 1977, the Court decided 
Chevron U.S.A.  Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., a 
hallmark of administrative law.68  The Court held that the EPA as the 
                                                          
62 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 310 (1981) 
[hereinafter Milwaukee II].  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972 gave the EPA power to regulate under this law and maintained any prior 
requirements established by the EPA as requirements for obtaining a permit.  Id. at 
311.  Permits were then issued either by state agencies that qualified or by the EPA 
itself.  Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 325.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 See Melnick, supra note 43.  Melnick contends that between 1970 and 
1980, federal courts had heard “hundreds of cases dealing with air pollutants” and 
issued rulings “profoundly affecting national environmental policies” to fill in the 
void left open by the current legislation.  Id. at 1.  
68 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  
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administrative agency delegated to implement the provisions of the 
CAA stood in a better position to enforce these regulations than a 
federal judge.69 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, decided 
in 2006, mirrors some of the same issues and concerns in the present 
case and, as discussed infra, controls the Court’s reasoning.70  In that 
case, several states brought suit against the EPA for failure to 
regulate emissions from motor vehicles under the CAA.71  The Court 
found that Massachusetts had standing because of its property 
interests in shoreline which would be threatened by the rise of sea 
levels caused by global warming, and this global warming stemmed 
from the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by 
automobiles.72  The Court further found that, “EPA has refused to 
comply with this clear statutory command” to regulate greenhouse 
gases.73  The Court determined that the EPA had offered no 
“reasonable explanation” as to why it had not regulated greenhouse 
gases and directed them on remand to either base its inaction or 
action in regulating carbon dioxide on the statute.74 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, the EPA entered into a settlement 
agreement and publically stated in part:  
 
Under the proposed settlement agreement, EPA will 
sign by July 26, 2011, and will transmit to the Office 
of the Federal Register within five business days, a 
proposed rule under section 111(b) that includes 
standards of performance for GHGs for new and 
                                                          
69 Id. at 845.  The Court focused much of its analysis on the political 
questions stating, “federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.  The responsibilities for 
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones.”  Id. at 866.  Chevron 
stands for the notion that where an administration agency has undertaken to 
regulate in a certain area as delegated to do so by Congress, federal judges sit in no 
position to overrule the agency’s legitimate policy determinations.  
70 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2006).  
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 533.  
74 Id. at 534-35.  
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modified EGUs that are subject to 40 CFR part 60, 
subpart Da.  EPA will also sign by July 26, 2011, and 
will transmit to the Office of the Federal Register 
within five business days, a proposed rule under 
section 111(d) that includes emissions guidelines for 
GHGs from existing EGUs that would have been 
subject to 40 CFR part 60, subpart Da if they were new 
sources.  Under the proposed settlement agreement 
EPA will take final action with respect to the proposed 
rule no later than May 26, 2012.  The proposed 
settlement agreement provides that EPA's fulfillment 
of its obligations under the agreement shall result in a 
full and final release of any claims that State and 
Environmental Petitioners may have under any 
provision of law to compel EPA to respond to the 
Court's Remand Order with respect to GHG emissions 
from EGUs.75 
 
It is this settlement agreement, issued by the EPA between the time 
respondents filed suit in the present case and the Supreme Court 
issued its decision, which exemplifies the current state of 
enforcement of the CAA.  A new ruling regarding the emission 
standards of carbon dioxide will be promulgated in mid-2012 and 
perhaps the area of environmental law will evolve once again to 
accommodate these regulations.   
 
III.  FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Respondents consist of two separate groups bound together 
by a common threat.76  In 2004, eight states and the city of New York 
                                                          
75 Proposed Settlement Agreement, Clean Air Act Citizen Suit, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 82392 (Dec. 30, 2010) (emphasis added).  
76 Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 
2009).  California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Wisconsin, and the City of New York filed a complaint against American 
Electric Power Company, Inc., American Electric Power Service Corporation, 
Southern Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Excel Energy, and Cinergy 
Corporation in 2004.  Id.  Shortly thereafter in July of 2004, The Open Space 
Institute, Inc., The Open Space Conservancy, Inc., and the Audubon Society of 
New Hampshire filed a complaint against the same six plaintiffs.  Id.  Respondents 
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filed suit against petitioners, the five largest emitters of carbon 
dioxide in the United States; respondent land trusts filed a parallel 
suit shortly thereafter.77  Collectively, the respondent states represent 
the interests of more than 77 million citizens and “their related 
environments, natural resources, and economies.”78  Petitioners 
annually emit 650 million tons of carbon dioxide, constituting a 
quarter of all emissions from the domestic power sector and 10% of 
total domestic anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
79  This carbon dioxide 
then works to trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere resulting in the 
climate trend know as global warming, during which temperature 
levels rose approximately .75 to 5 degrees Fahrenheit between the 
years 1900 and 2005.80  The EPA projects this trend of rising 
temperatures will continue, predicting an increase in temperature of 
around four to five degrees by the year 2100.81  
“[W]armer average temperatures, later fall freezes and earlier 
spring thaws, and the decrease in average snowfall and duration of 
snow cover on the ground” are some of the injuries suffered by 
respondent states as a result of the increase in global temperatures 
caused by the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
into the atmosphere.82  The respondent states estimate costs in the 
billions of dollars to respond to these problems caused by global 
                                                          
named American Electric Power Service Corporation as a defendant to the original 
lawsuit, however, they are not an emitter of carbon dioxide, but a management 
service for American Electric Power Company, Inc.  Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 268 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
79 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2534.  This constitutes 2.5% of 
the world’s total emissions from human activities.  Id.  
80 American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 314. 
81 Id.  The EPA’s estimate of global temperature increase seems optimistic 
in relation to other estimates.  Respondent land trusts cite reports predicting a much 
bleaker outcome.  They cite to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
who estimates global temperatures will have risen approximately 2.5 to 10.4 
degrees Fahrenheit between 1990 and 2100.  Id.  
82 Id. at 317.  The respondent states also assert they will suffer myriad 
future injuries from petitioners’ unrestrained emitting of carbon dioxide.  Id. at 
317-18.  These future injuries include: increased smog leading to respiratory issues, 
substantial coastal erosion, salinization of marshes and water supplies, prolonged 
heat waves resulting in a higher frequency of heat related illness and death, 
increased wildfires and the disruption of ecosystems.  Id. at 318.    
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warming and assert a direct causal link between petitioner’s 
emissions of carbon dioxide and their injuries.83  Respondent land 
trusts suffer slightly different injuries than the respondent states that 
represent the general public.84  The Open Space Institute (OSI) and 
Open Space Conservancy (organized to carry out the purposes of the 
OSI) together hold land and easements valuing approximately $56 
million and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire (Audubon) 
owns over 6,000 acres of land for conservation.85  Global warming 
from greenhouse gases causes permanent damage to the land held by 
these trusts by diminishing their value through the destruction of 
wildlife habitat, for example.86  Because these pieces of land were 
specifically selected by the trusts for purchase based on their 
aesthetic as well as ecological value, the harm caused by global 
warming will directly diminish their value and frustrate their purpose 
of conservation and scientific study.87    
Together, the plaintiff states and land trusts sought relief in 
Federal District Court in the Southern District of New York 
requesting the court place a cap on the carbon dioxide emissions of 
defendants and then reduce the capped amount annually under a 
theory of a federal common law tort of nuisance and alternatively 
under a state tort theory.88  The district court dismissed the case in 
2005 on a motion for summary judgment declaring the issue a non-
justiciable political question.89  Plaintiffs appealed to the Second 
                                                          
83 Id. at 317.  Further, California suffered a reduction in its mountain 
snowpack, leading to a decrease in available drinking water obtained from the 
summer runoff into stream flows.  Id.  
84 Id. at 318.  The three land trusts are non-profit organizations formed for 
the purpose of acquiring and preserving “ecologically significant and sensitive 
properties for scientific and educational purposes,” as well as for the enjoyment of 
the public at large.  Id.  The land trusts own a variety of different properties with 
unique environmental significance, including nature sanctuaries, wildlife preserves 
and open spaces.  Id.  
85 Id. 
86 American Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 317.  Respondent land trusts 
assert for example that the rise in coastal waters will inundate some of their 
properties and cause irreversible damage to forests, marshes and other wildlife 
habitats.  Id. at 318. 
87 Id. at 318-19.  
88 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532.  
89 Id. at 2534.  
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Circuit, and the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the lower 
court.90  In doing so, the court of appeals relied heavily on Milwaukee 
I,91 which confirmed the existence of a federal common law 
concerning air and water92 and found the EPA’s lack of regulation on 
the matter dispositive.93  The Supreme Court granted certiorari on 
December 6, 2010.94   
 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF OPINION 
 
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, with 
Justice Alito filing a concurrence in which Justice Thomas joined.95  
She begins with a brief overview of the Court’s analysis and 
determination in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 
and the EPA’s response to the decision of that case.96  Following a 
cursory overview of the procedural history, Justice Ginsburg then 
briefly addresses the issue of standing before delving into a detailed 
analysis of the displacement of federal common law.97   
 
A.  Standing 
 
Justice Ginsburg devotes only a small portion of her opinion 
to addressing the petitioners’ assertion that the federal courts lacked 
authority to adjudicate the respondents’ claims, although it has 
historically appeared as a major hurdle to plaintiffs in environmental 
cases.  Article III of the Constitution, which governs federal courts, 
limits their jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.”98  This 
                                                          
90 Id.  
91 Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 91.  
92 Id. at 103 (holding that “[w]hen we deal with air and water in their 
ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law”). 
93 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
94 American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 813 (2010). 
95 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2531.  Justice Alito, with 
whom Justice Thomas joins, concurs in the judgment and the analysis assuming, 
arguendo, the Court previously analyzed and interpreted the CAA in 
Massachusetts v. EPA—in which both dissented—correctly.  Id. at 2540-41.    
96 Id. at 2532-33. 
97 Id. at 2533-40. 
98 U.S. Const. Art. III, Sect. 2.  
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language has previously been interpreted to require “questions 
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed 
as capable of resolution through the judicial process,” thereby 
precluding all political questions.99  
The Court’s 5-4 split over this issue in a similar case just four 
years earlier illustrates this point.100  With only eight Justices taking 
part in the decision of the present case,101 Justice Ginsburg notes, 
“Four members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs 
have Article III standing under Massachusetts . . . . Four members of 
the Court, adhering to a dissenting opinion in Massachusetts . . . or 
regarding that decision as distinguishable, would hold that none of 
the plaintiffs have Article III standing.”102  
For many hoping the present case would bring clarity to the 
issue of standing in environmental suits, the Court’s equally divided 
split simply extends the shaky groundwork already in place, rather 
than building a concrete base for plaintiffs to rely on in future suits.  
Allotting only one paragraph to even mentioning this threshold issue 
leaves much in this area to question and does not fully resolve the 
issue.  The Court entirely relies on their decision in Massachusetts, 
                                                          
99 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).  In determining whether a 
private citizen met the requirements of standing simply by virtue of being a 
taxpayer, the Court grappled with the issues of both standing and justiciability as a 
subset of the doctrine of standing.  Id. at 99.  The Court found that the taxpayer-
appellants in that case had sufficiently established standing through a showing that 
use of taxpayer funds through Congress’s power to spend for the general welfare in 
that case violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 103.  
100 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2006).  In 
2007, Massachusetts asserted standing to bring suit against the EPA for failure to 
regulate carbon emissions from vehicles based on their unique position of owning 
several miles of coastline which they asserted would be diminished by a rise in sea 
level during global warming directly caused by the release of carbon emissions into 
the atmosphere.  Id.  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, found Massachusetts 
to have standing to bring the suit. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer 
joined in his majority opinion.  Id.  Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia 
filed dissenting opinions with which Justice Thomas and Justice Alito joined both, 
arguing that in fact, Massachusetts and the other petitioners lacked standing to sue 
because they did not suffer a personal or direct injury.  Id. at 535-60.   
101 Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision or consideration of this 
case.  See American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.  
102  Id. at 2535. 
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but gives no explanation as to why or how they came to their 
conclusion.  Perhaps they analogized California’s depleting snow 
packs with Massachusetts’s declining shoreline, but they do nothing 
to clarify that in the opinion.103  
The changing composition of the Court may impact the issue 
of standing in suits under the CAA and may well have played a part 
in the present case.  Since the Court decided Massachusetts back in 
2007, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter retired and Justice 
Sotomayor and Justice Kagan succeeded them.  This change in the 
composition of the Court may have some effect on the decision of 
standing since both Justices Stevens and Souter found Massachusetts 
to meet the case or controversy requirement in 2007.104  
The equally divided split and Justice Ginsburg’s superficial 
treatment of the questions of standing and justiciability leave open 
uncertainty for future plaintiff’s attempting to bring suit in federal 
court.  Justice Alito, who dissented in Massachusetts, wrote 
separately to concur in just two sentences.105  His shift from 
dissenting in Massachusetts to concurring in the present case at first 
glance seems to suggest he has abandoned his previous rationale and 
shifted allegiances, however, his use of the term “for the sake of 
argument” suggests otherwise.106  The cryptic phrasing of Justice 
Alito’s dissent and the terse treatment of the issue by Justice 
Ginsburg leave the door open for future dissention over the matter in 
the federal courts and does nothing to clarify the Court’s previous 
findings in Massachusetts.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103 Id. at 2535.  
104 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 501 (2006).  
105 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540-41.  Justice Alito, joined 
by Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wrote, “I 
concur in the judgment, and I agree with the Court’s displacement analysis on the 
assumption (which I make for the sake of argument because no party contends 
otherwise) that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, adopted 
by the majority in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 . . . (2007), is correct.”  
Id.   
106 Id.  
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B.  Displacement 
 
Justice Ginsburg begins her discussion of displacement by 
stating, “‘There is no federal general common law,’ Erie Railroad 
Co.  v.  Tompkins.  .  .  famously recognized.  In the wake of Erie, 
however, a keener understanding developed.”107  She then goes on to 
address the exception to the Erie rule which allows for federal 
common law in areas “‘within national legislative power,’ one in 
which federal courts may fill in ‘statutory interstices,’ and, if 
necessary, even ‘fashion federal law.’”108  She agrees with petitioners 
that environmental protections fall into the category of this 
exceptions, however, she asserts that “[r]ecognition that a subject is 
meet for federal law governance, however, does not necessarily mean 
that federal courts should create the controlling law.”109  
After recognizing the existence of a federal common law and 
placing air pollution within the purview of such a law, Ginsburg 
addresses the alternative possibilities of which law should apply to 
the regulation of carbon emissions from stationary sources.110  She 
first addresses the possibility of applying state common law to the 
issue, but determines such as inappropriate based on the interstate 
characteristics of the pollution.111  She distinguishes the cases 
respondent states and land trusts cite as precedent for their assertions 
of a tort theory of state nuisance law as instances which permitted 
states to file suits challenging “activity harmful to their citizens’ 
health and welfare.”112  
Here, the Court deals with a case not of permitting a state to 
sue in order to benefit its citizens’ health or welfare, but to abate “any 
and all manner of pollution originating outside its borders.”113  
                                                          
107 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); American Elec. 
Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
108 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citing Erie, 304 U.S. at 
421-22).  
109 Id. at 2536.  
110 Id.   
111 Id.  Justice Ginsburg writes, “And where, as here, borrowing the law of 
a particular State would be inappropriate, the Court remains mindful that it does not 
have creative power akin to that vested in Congress.”  Id.  
112 Id.  
113 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2535. 
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Further, the case presents an issue of first impression to the Court by 
dealing with not only a state as a plaintiff, but whether a political 
subdivision, in the case of New York City and private citizens, the 
land trusts, may invoke the federal common law of nuisance to abate 
pollution.114 
After addressing federal common law, Justice Ginsburg next 
turns to the issue of public nuisance laws.  She asserts that the court 
has “recognized that public nuisance law, like common law 
generally, adapts to changing scientific and factual circumstances.”115  
Once she groups federal common law and state nuisance laws 
together, Justice Ginsburg next dismisses the entire idea of them as 
one of academic pursuit only.116  She finds that, “[a]ny such claim 
would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to 
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”117  
Justice Ginsburg rests her analysis of displacement of federal 
common law on the Court’s holding in Milwaukee II, which found 
that once Congress acts on an issue previously governed by federal 
common law, the need for that common law disappears.118  She 
offers that, “The test for whether congressional legislation excludes 
the declaration of federal common law is simply whether the statute 
‘speaks directly to [the] question’ at issue.”119  By this analysis, she 
analogizes the enactment of the Clean Water Act with the CAA and 
holds that the CAA and the actions it authorizes for the EPA to take 
“displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-
dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”120  She 
outlines the procedures to be taken for enforcement under the act and 
reinforces the Court’s previous finding that CO2 qualifies as an air 
pollutant under the CAA.121  Once the EPA lists categories of 
stationary sources to be controlled, each state then issues its 
performance standards and if the states or the EPA fail to enforce the 
                                                          
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 2536.  
116 Id. at 2537.  
117 Id. 
118 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. 
121Id.  
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standards they have set, the CAA “permits ‘any person’ to bring a 
civil enforcement action in federal court.”122 
Justice Ginsburg devotes the remainder of her opinion to 
reconciling the issue of the timing of the present case and the 
displacement of the federal common law.  After determining that the 
CAA displaces the federal common law, she offers that a plaintiff 
might have recourse against the EPA for not acting upon its 
mandate.123  She previously stated that because the EPA entered into 
a settlement agreement in which the agency agreed to set standards 
for fossil-fuel power plant’s greenhouse gas emissions, the federal 
common law has therefore been displaced.124  The issue here is that 
the present litigation began before the settlement agreement existed, 
although many of the parties to the settlement agreement are also 
parties to the present case.125  Here the Court diverges from the 
holdings of the Second Circuit, which found displacement only to 
occur at the time of actual rulemaking.126  She addresses this issue by 
stating, “The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the 
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from 
power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common 
law.”127  She primarily bases her argument on the idea of agency 
expertise above that of individual federal judges making case-by-case 
determinations and the complexity of the delegated requirements in 
the CAA.128  She determines that these two ideas “cannot be 
reconciled with the decision making scheme” established by 
Congress.129  Justice Ginsburg solidly bases this analysis on the 
                                                          
122 Id. at 2537-38. (citing § 7604(a)).  
123 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.  Justice Ginsburg 
writes, “If EPA does not set emissions limits for a particular pollutant or source of 
pollution, States and private parties may petition for a rulemaking on the matter, 
and EPA’s response will be reviewable in federal court.”  Id.  This was the case in 
Massachusetts, where petitioners sought to require the EPA to regulate emissions 
from automobiles as a required under the CAA.  See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2006).  
124 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.  
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2539-40.  
129 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.  
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Chevron Doctrine, but it leaves unanswered the question, during 
these dead waiting periods, what recourse do states and private 
citizens have against harm caused by those not yet regulated by the 
administrative agency delegated to do so?130 
 
V.  IMPACT 
 
A.  Federal Common Law 
 
Erie refuted the existence of federal common law, but 
Milwaukee I reserved it only when dealing with water and air in their 
ambient states.  Unlike other areas of the law, environmental issues, 
specifically those dealing with water and air, can be seen as 
inherently national since, as respondents argued in this case, 
pollution originating in Alabama effects the health and quality of life 
of citizens in California, as well as the value of their personal 
property, even though the two states are not contiguous.  The 
Supreme Court recognized in Milwaukee II, the creation of federal 
common law in matters of water pollution arose from their concern 
that without such laws plaintiffs had no other forum in which to 
preserve their interests.131  
As explained in Milwaukee II, when deciding whether to 
apply federal statutory or common law the Court’s analysis begins 
“with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to 
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of 
federal law.”132  Justice Scalia noted in Milwaukee II that “when 
Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision 
                                                          
130 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 
U.S. 837 (1984).  In one of the most influential cases dealing with administrative 
law, the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s definition of “statutory source” for 
purposes of regulation as per the CAA.  Id.  It established a two-part test by which 
a court must interpret an agency’s construction of a statute.  First, the court must 
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, 
and second, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, 
the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”  Id. at 842-43. 
131 Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 325.  
132 Id. at 317.  
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rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise 
of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”133 
Prior to the decision in the present case, courts and academics 
believed that unlike the Clean Water Act and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, the CAA failed to displace federal common 
law in the area of air pollution control because it did not regulate all 
the potential sources of air pollution.134  However, following Justice 
Ginsburg’s reasoning in the present case, the CAA does displace all 
federal common law claims regarding air pollutants.  The present 
decision makes clear that we need no longer determine whether 
federal common law applies after the passage of the CAA.  Justice 
Ginsburg plainly states, “it is an academic question whether, in the 
absence of the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions the Act authorizes, 
the plaintiffs could state a federal common law claim for curtailment 
                                                          
133 Id. at 314.  
134 Id.  See also Connecticut v. American Elec. Power Co., 582 F. 3d. 309, 
378 (2009).  In their analysis of the instant case, the Second Circuit reasoned that 
“no Supreme Court case has held that the CAA has displaced federal common law 
in the area of air pollution” and disagreed with the district court in New Jersey’s 
finding that congressional findings calling the law “comprehensive,” “equated the 
CAA with the FWPCA” and thus, automatically finding federal common law 
preempted without further analysis.  Id. at n.47; United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 
F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982).  See also John Wood, Easier Said Than Done: 
Displacing Public Nuisance When States Sue for Climate Change Damages,41 
ENVT’L L. REP. 10316 (Apr. 2011).  Wood argues that, “involvement on the part of 
the judiciary and the states is more justified in the context of climate change . . . 
because of the degree of uncertainty pervading the issue . . .”and therefore, “the 
option value of environmental control mechanisms increases.”  Id. at 10323. He 
analogizes the role of the judiciary to a baseball game, offering:  
 
The judiciary is the pinch hitter (via nuisance liability), in case 
EPA promises to hit a foul (by promulgating a regulatory 
scheme that exceeds authority under the CAA), and in case 
Congress promises to bunt (via legislation that compromises 
too much and fails to mitigate climate change risks); and the 
judiciary is the backstop, in case either branch strikes out (that 
is, fails to regulate carbon emissions); and the judiciary is the 
umpire, as to the adequacy of the executive and congressional 
measures (federal common-law protection is the equitable 
standard against which executive and congressional schemes 
are evaluated).  
 
Id. at 10325.  
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of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global 
warming.”135  
Even though at the time of the Court’s holding, the EPA had 
yet to issue standards regarding the emission of CO2 from statutory 
sources, the remedy of federal common law suit still sits unavailable 
to respondents, despite the fact that they filed their suit prior to the 
settlement agreement in which the EPA agreed to regulate such 
sources.  Further, Justice Ginsburg later offers states or private 
parties the option to petition the EPA for a rulemaking on the matter 
if these parties feel the EPA sits outside of compliance with the 
CAA.136  
The Court’s decision in the present case eliminates the federal 
common law of nuisance altogether.  With the holding in Milwaukee 
I reserving federal common law only to areas of air and water in their 
ambient states, and the Court later finding that “the federal common 
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted 
by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA [Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act] . . . ,”137 the action effectively no longer 
existed for water pollution.  The holdings in the present case 
eliminate the federal common law nuisance action for abatement of 
air pollution.  These two decisions taken together abolish both areas 
in which such a claim of nuisance might have been made, thereby 
removing it all together in environmental law.138 
Since the holding in the present case, it has been applied by 
several district courts,139 as well as the Seventh Circuit in Michigan 
                                                          
135 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537.  
136 Id. at 2538.  
137 Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 
U.S. 1, 22 (1981).  
138 Federal common law may still exist as an avenue for litigants in areas 
exclusively governed by federal law, such as bankruptcy, admiralty or antitrust.  
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).  
139 See e.g. Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 6:09-cv-
00037-RB-LFG, 2011 WL 3924489 (D. N. M. Aug. 3, 2011).; Union Pac. R. Co. v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 8:08CV336, 2011 WL 6337599 (D. Neb. Dec. 
19, 2011); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Locke, No. C 10-04790 CRB, 
2011 WL 3443533 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2011); U.S. v. Eme Homer City Generation 
L.P., No. 2:11-cv-19, WL 4859993 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011); Genesee Cnty. Emp. 
Retirement Sys. v. Thornburg Mortg. Sec. Trust, No. CIV 09-0300 JB/KMB, 2011 
WL 5840482 (D. N.M. Nov. 12, 2011).  
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v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.140  In that case, plaintiffs brought 
suit under a theory of the federal common law of nuisance based on 
alleged mismanagement by defendants of the Chicago Area 
Waterways System.141  They asserted that such mismanagement 
would allow invasive carp to enter the ecosystem of the Great Lakes 
damaging the ecology of the lake system and threatening “billion-
dollar industries that depend on the existing ecosystem.”142  Applying 
the reasoning of American Electric Power Co., the Seventh Circuit 
found that defendants, along with administrative agencies and 
experts, had launched “a full-scale effort to stop the carp from 
reaching the Great Lakes,” and promised to continue taking further 
steps to avoid the potential ecological disaster.143  The court found 
that even without the “formal legal regime that caused the Supreme 
Court to find displacement . . . we have something close to it.”144  
The Seventh Circuit found displacement of the common law based on 
the regulatory scheme and denied plaintiff’s injunction.  
The application of the holding by the Seventh Circuit 
demonstrates the impact of the displacement analysis and its 
bolstering of administrative power.  In that case, rather than one 
Congressional act or one agency’s rulemaking, the court found that 
several agencies taking steps (or promising future steps) to combat a 
perceived harm was sufficient to justify displacement of the federal 
common law of nuisance.  This illustrates the growing reliance on 
and authority of administrative law in our environmental regulatory 
system.  
The closing of the door to federal common law suits for 
plaintiffs wishing to abate air pollution may weaken the role of 
federal judges in the area of environmental law, but on the other 
hand, it strengthens the role of the administrative law judges.  The 
present case takes an entire genre of litigation—air pollution—and 
places it outside the realm of federal judge determination and solely 
into the hands of the administrative agency to which Congress 
delegated the task.  Still, depending on the future course of the EPA’s 
                                                          
140 Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 10-3891, 2011 WL 
3836457 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2011).  
141 Id. at *1.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *2.  
144 Id. 
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regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, perhaps, the door will open 
again someday.  For now, however, the decision in this case firmly 
establishes the EPA as the deciding voice in the regulation of air 
quality and deeply erodes the power of the states in an area they 
traditionally controlled.  
 
B.  State Nuisance Tort 
 
 The Court declines to take up respondents’ state law claims, 
as did the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.145  Justice Ginsburg 
writes, “the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends, inter alia, 
on the preemptive effect of the federal Act.”146  The respondents 
sought relief under the state tort law of nuisance in the source state of 
the emissions.147  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public 
nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public.”148  The use of public nuisance to abate air pollution 
in the form of smoke dates back as far as King Edward III in 
England.149  Nuisance law today takes the form of statutes, common 
                                                          
145  American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B (1977).  The Restatement goes 
on to give three factors to consider in determining whether the interference is 
unreasonable:  
 
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference 
with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the 
public comfort or the public convenience, or 
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance, 
or administrative regulations, or  
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has 
produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor 
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the 
public right. 
 
At common law, public nuisance covered a broad range of conduct including the 
keeping of diseased animals, the shooting of fireworks in the street, or even the 
operating of a house of prostitution.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b 
(1977). 
149 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. a (1977).  At this time, 
public nuisance was thought of as an “infringement of the rights of the Crown,” 
and was documented to have “extended to the invasion of the rights of the public, 
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law or a mixture of both depending on the state.150  For example, 
California defines nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to 
health . . . ”151 and a public nuisance as “one which affects at the 
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable 
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage 
inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.”152 
 Observers have noted a resurgence in the use of public 
nuisance in the area of environmental law,153 but some courts have 
been reluctant to rule on such a theory.  Recently, in North Carolina 
v. Tennessee Valley Authority,154 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
stated, “The ancient common law of public nuisance is not ordinarily 
the means by which such major conflicts among governmental 
                                                          
represented by the Crown, by such things as . . . smoke from a lime-pit that 
inconvenienced a whole town.”  Id.  This tort can be distinguished from private 
nuisance because it does not require interference with the enjoyment of one’s land.  
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. h (1977). 
150 Emily Sangi, The Gap-Filling Role of Nuisance in Interstate Air 
Pollution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479, 502 (2011).  
151 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2011).  The statute offers a non-
exhaustive list of what might constitute a nuisance including, “the illegal sale of 
controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to 
the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or 
property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, 
of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, 
square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.”  Id.  
152 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2011).  
153 F. William Brownell, State Common Law of Public Nuisance in the 
Modern Administrative State, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T  34, 34 (2009-2010). 
154 North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010).  
The state of North Carolina brought suit against the Tennessee Valley Authority 
operating plants in Alabama, Tennessee and Kentucky.  North Carolina passed a 
law requiring public utilities operating coal-fired generator units to reduce their 
emissions to more stringent levels than those required by the EPA pursuant to the 
CAA.  Subsequently, North Carolina became aware of emissions arising from 
Tennessee Valley Authority plants located in other states moving eastward across 
its borders.  They brought an action seeking injunction against these coal-fired 
power plants.  The Fourth Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Int’l 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), that the court must apply the nuisance 
law of the source state, and the claim failed under both Alabama and Kentucky law.  
They argued finding otherwise would undermine the regulatory scheme established 
by Congress and the EPA. 
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entities are resolved in . . . American governance.”155  The Fourth 
Circuit articulated the chief concern associated with the use of 
nuisance to promulgate air standards.156  It warned that upholding 
such a ruling “would encourage courts to use vague public nuisance 
standards to scuttle the nation’s carefully created system for 
accommodating the need for energy production and the need for 
clean air.  The result would be . . . a confused patchwork of 
standards, to the detriment of industry and the environment alike.”157  
Dissemination of standardized regulations by a federal agency 
eliminated the problem of a “patchwork of standards” by creating 
uniformity.  
 Those critical of the CAA, however, believe rather than 
creating uniformity, it actually incentivizes states to literally blow 
their pollution elsewhere through its regulatory scheme of National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and State Implementation 
Plans (SIPs).158  They view these standards as “underinclusive . . . 
because a state could meet the applicable ambient standards but 
nonetheless export a great deal of pollution to downwind states 
because the sources in the state . . . are located near the interstate 
border.”159  A state initiated public nuisance suit against another state 
                                                          
155 North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 
2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 593 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 
(W.D.N.C. 2009)).  
156 North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 
2010).  
157 Id.  
158 F. William Brownell, Clean Air Act in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 231, 232-42 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007).  The CAA addresses 
ambient air pollution by setting NAAQS for certain pollutants which endanger the 
public health.  Id.  These are set levels of certain elements in the air which are to be 
reviewed and revised every five years and creates a substantial challenge to the 
EPA’s effective implementation of the CAA.  Id.  The pollutants regulated include 
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone and 
lead.  Id.  These NAAQS are enforced upon the states in the form of SIPs.  This 
grants authority to each state to regulate emissions from sources within its borders 
in order to meet the NAAQS.  SIPs have numerous requirements and must be 
updated within three years of any new or updated NAAQS.  Id.  
159 Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental 
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2350 (June 1996).  Arguing that empirical 
data illustrates the increased use of tall stacks after the 1970 enactment of the CAA, 
Revesz asserts:  
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exhibiting such behavior may act as a way to fill in the regulatory 
gap.  
 As discussed supra, application of the CAA often mirrors that 
of the Clean Water Act, and the American Electric Power Co.  Court 
has deemed this to be the same when dealing with the idea of public 
nuisance.160  Both statutes contain nearly identical savings clauses 
and the Court interpreted the Clean Water Act’s savings clause in 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,161 as “not preclud[ing] 
aggrieved individuals from bringing a nuisance claim pursuant to the 
law of the source State.”162  The present case extends this holding to 
the CAA.163  By doing so, the Court’s decision leaves this door ajar 
as a potential future avenue for states’ grievances by not decisively 
taking up the issue on the merits.164  Consequently, public nuisance 
action in the source state may continue to play a viable role in 
reducing ambient air pollution by providing states inundated with 
external pollution an avenue outside of the administrative law context 
in which to address grievances. 
  
C.  Role of the Administrative Law Judges 
 
In “[o]ne of the most significant changes in civil 
enforcement,” the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act granted 
                                                          
 
The best evidence that states do indeed encourage sources to use 
tall stacks can be found in the provisions of the SIPs adopted by 
at least fifteen states . . . . These SIPs allowed sources to meet the 
NAAQS by using taller stacks rather than by reducing emissions.  
In those SIPs, the permissible level of emissions was an 
increasing function of the height of the stack.  If the stack was 
sufficiently high, the effects would be felt only in the downwind 
states and would therefore have no impact on in-state ambient air-
quality levels. Through these measures, the states created strong 
incentives for their firms to externalize the effects of their sources 
of pollution.  Id. at 2351-52. 
 
160 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540. 
161 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).  
162 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting Int’l Paper Co. 
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 497).  
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
    
Spring 2012 Happy Air  245 
the EPA the ability to enforce administrative penalties through the 
Office of the Administrator rather than referring all cases to the 
Department of Justice and the court system.165  Modeled after the 
Clean Water Act, the Amendments limit jurisdiction of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to matters in which “the total 
penalty sought does not exceed $200,000 and the first alleged date of 
violation occurred no more than 12 months prior to the initiation of 
the administrative action . . . ,” unless the EPA Administrator and the 
Attorney General agree to a higher penalty.166  Throughout the course 
of enforcement, ALJs may serve as neutrals during an Alternative 
Dispute Resolution process or fact-finders and decision makers 
during litigation.167  The Environmental Appeals Board reviews 
appeals of ALJ decisions.168  The Administrative Procedure Act 
governs these proceedings.169  The inclusion of this change in the 
                                                          
165 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 231, 290 (Sullivan ed., 19th ed. 2007).  The CAA also authorizes 
criminal prosecutions of those who knowingly violate the statute.  Id. at 291.  Since 
the 1990 Amendments to the CAA, criminal penalties have increased to five years 
imprisonment and a fine of $250,000 per day for individuals and $500,000 per day 
for corporations. Id.  Criminal penalties may also be incurred for lower standards of 
mens rea including negligence.  Id. at 291-92.  The Department of Justice oversees 
the prosecution of these criminal penalties through the courts, rather than before an 
ALJ.  
166 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (2006).  
167 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Citizen’s Guide, OFFICE OF ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/oalj/orders/citizens-
guide.pdf.  The EPA offers mediation services free of charge in which an ALJ, 
appointed by the Office of Administrative Law Judges, serves as the neutral.  U.S. 
Envtl. Protection Agency, About the Office of Administrative Law Judges (Jan. 30, 
2012), www.epa.gov/oalj/about.htm.  If no resolution can be reached through 
mediation a different ALJ will be assigned to the case for litigation.  Id.  
This system in which ALJs serve both as neutrals and as adjudicators has been 
critiqued by those who question their ability to truly serve as neutrals while on the 
payroll of the EPA and by those who understand the difficulty of one person 
playing both roles.  While the ALJ who serves as the mediator for a case will not 
ultimately be the same person appointed to oversee the adjudication and make a 
determination, the EPA ALJs do wear both hats.  This requires them not only to be 
well-versed in the environmental laws in which they administer and administrative 
procedures, but also the art of mediation and alternative dispute resolution.  
168 Office of Administrative Law Judges, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/oalj/.  
169 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1966).  
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1990 Amendments grants the EPA greater autonomy to enforce the 
CAA and a heightened ability to quickly reach settlement 
agreements.170  
The Court’s decision in the present case, precluding federal 
courts from promulgating standards for greenhouse gas emissions, 
limits future enforcement to three avenues: EPA initiated suits either 
before an ALJ or district judge depending on the penalty amount, 
state public nuisance actions as discussed supra, or citizen suits.171  
                                                          
170 See Brownell, supra note 165, at 290.  
171 42 U.S.C. § 7604.  This code section, which authorizes citizen suits to 
enforce the provisions of the Clean Air Act reads in pertinent part:  
 
(a) Authority to bring civil action; jurisdiction 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person 
may commence a civil action on his own behalf— 
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) 
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent 
permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is 
alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged 
violation has been repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an 
emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order 
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a 
standard or limitation, 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of 
the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter 
which is not discretionary with the Administrator, or 
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs 
any new or modified major emitting facility without a permit 
required under part C of subchapter I of this chapter (relating to 
significant deterioration of air quality) or part D of subchapter I of 
this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is alleged to have 
violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been 
repeated) or to be in violation of any condition of such permit. 
. . . .  
(c) Venue; intervention by Administrator; service of complaint; 
consent judgment 
(1) Any action respecting a violation by a stationary source of an 
emission standard or limitation or an order respecting such 
standard or limitation may be brought only in the judicial district 
in which such source is located. 
(2) In any action under this section, the Administrator, if not a 
party, may intervene as a matter of right at any time in the 
proceeding.  A judgment in an action under this section to which 
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While states may still find standing to bring suit under a state 
nuisance tort scheme, as discussed above, the emphasis of 
enforcement on the EPA and the placement of air pollution 
regulations within the administrative law context gives great 
responsibility and influence to the ALJs charged with overseeing 
prosecution and litigation under the CAA.  
Data reported for EPA’s fiscal year of 2011 illustrates the 
importance of and emphasis placed on ALJs in administering the 
CAA.  In the agency’s Enforcement and Compliance Annual Results, 
the EPA reported $19 million in penalties assessed under the CAA by 
ALJs.172  That number rose steeply from $6 million assessed in both 
2009 and 2010, an increase of more than 310%.173  Additionally, the 
EPA issued 1,735 final administrative penalty orders and 1,324 
administrative compliance orders.174  The EPA reported it “focuses 
                                                          
the United States is not a party shall not, however, have any 
binding effect upon the United States. 
(3) Whenever any action is brought under this section the plaintiff 
shall serve a copy of the complaint on the Attorney General of the 
United States and on the Administrator.  No consent judgment 
shall be entered in an action brought under this section in which 
the United States is not a party prior to 45 days following the 
receipt of a copy of the proposed consent judgment by the 
Attorney General and the Administrator during which time the 
Government may submit its comments on the proposed consent 
judgment to the court and parties or may intervene as a matter of 
right.  Id. 
 
The statute grants to citizens the ability to bring suit against the EPA Administrator 
or against polluters not being prosecuted by the Administrator.  While the statue 
grants jurisdiction to the district courts and not to the ALJs, the statute still grants 
considerable power to the administrative agency by requiring the administrator 
receive notice of the suit, not allowing judgment to be entered without fulfillment 
of the notice period requirement and, most importantly, by allowing intervention by 
the administrator to become a party to the suit.  Id.  
172 FY2011 Enforcement & Compliance Annual Results, Office of 
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Dec. 
8, 2011), 
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/endofyear/eoy2011/resultscharts-
fy2011.pdf.  
173 Id.  The total amount of administrative penalties levied by the EPA in 
fiscal year 2011 was $48 million, the majority being violations of the CAA, 
followed by the Clean Water Act.  Id. 
174 Id. 
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on larger administrative cases,” rather than civil judicial cases, with 
only 182 civil judicial conclusions in 2011.175  
The numerical and monetary data illuminates the pivotal role 
ALJs play in administering and upholding the EPAs regulations 
under the CAA.  Orders issues by ALJs differ from holdings by 
federal courts in both the amount that can be litigated and the appeals 
process.  While ALJs may preside over only cases in which the fine 
does not exceed a certain amount prescribed by legislation, federal 
courts may oversee adjudication of much larger claims.  These dual 
avenues of enforcement allow the EPA flexibility in prosecuting 
offenders whose crimes carry a lesser fine without forcing the agency 
through the often expensive and time consuming process of litigation 
in the federal courts.  An administrative law hearing provides a more 
efficient and expeditious alternative to prosecute companies or 
persons violating environmental laws.  Additionally, all appeals of 
orders issued by ALJ’s go through the Environmental Appeals Board 
rather than through the appellate court system.  With the Court’s 
holding ushering in an end to federal common law, and the limited 
scope of availability for state nuisance tort claims, the ALJs may well 
become the keystone of the CAA.   
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
While American Electric Power Co. settles the questions 
regarding the federal common law of nuisance, it does little to clarify 
the issue of standing, which remains both a source of confusion and 
an obstacle to plaintiffs in environmental suits.  The Court’s decision 
also leaves open the avenue of state tort causes of action, particularly 
nuisance, for states seeking abatement of cross-border air pollution.  
On the surface, it may seem as though the displacement of federal 
common law weakens the cause of environmentalist, but when 
viewed through the lenses of administrative law, the opposite seems 
true.  
Rather than weakening environmental law, American Electric 
Power Co. may be read as strengthening administrative law.  Indeed, 
the mission of the EPA is to ensure that “all Americans are protected 
                                                          
175 Id. at 10. 
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from significant risks to human health and the environment . . .” and 
that “environmental protection contributes to making our 
communities and ecosystems diverse, sustainable and economically 
productive.”176  By consolidating the power to achieve these goals in 
one independent administrative agency it allows for uniform 
standards across the country, a streamlined method of enforcement, 
and the application of the law by specialized experts in the field, 
rather than piecemeal application by federal judges.  
The ruling in American Electric Power Co. eliminates the 
federal common law cause of action for nuisance at the present time, 
but leaves open the possibility of revival in the future if the current 
regulatory scheme changes or new issues arise in climate change 
science that are not fully addressed by the CAA and EPA’s system of 
enforcement.  The test laid out by the Court provides guidance for 
future decisions analyzing displacement, directing them to determine 
whether federal statutes and administrative regulations speak directly 
to the issue for which plaintiffs seek redress.  
As the controversy surrounding climate change continues and 
the battle over greenhouse gas regulations, particularly CO2 
emissions from industrial sources, marches on as a political topic of 
debate, the determination in the present case reaffirms the Court’s 
prior decision in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency 
that the CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases.177  
Although the Court hesitates to openly endorse a particular view of 
climate change,178 its determination that Congress intended the EPA 
to regulate greenhouse gases and that the EPA has ultimate authority 
in the area, seems to acknowledge the issue as a real and pressing 
matter requiring action. 
The Court’s decision marks a step forward both for 
environmental law and administrative law.  It endorses both climate 
change regulation and administrative authority.  American Electric 
Power Co. entrusts to administrative agencies and administrative law 
                                                          
176 Our Mission and What We Do, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY 
(June 8, 2011) http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/whatwedo.html.  
177 American Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2532; Massachusetts. v. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
178 “The Court, we caution, endorses no particular view of the complicated 
issues related to carbon-dioxide emissions and climate change.”  American Elec. 
Power 131 S. Ct. at n.2.  
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judges the responsibility of protecting that precious commodity 
essential to all life, yet despite so much research, still shrouded in 
controversy and mystery: air.  Even in light of the Court’s decision 
and the EPA’s future regulations, as long as skeptics exist in the 
scientific community and greenhouse gas emissions remain a topic of 
political discussion, air will remain:  
 
A Little road not made of man, 
Enabled of the eye, 
Accessible to thill of bee, 
Or cart of butterfly. 
 
If town it have, beyond itself, 
‘Tis that I cannot say; 
I only sigh,—no vehicle 
Bears me along that way.179 
 
                                                          
179 EMILY DICKINSON, THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 321 
(Thomas H. Johnson, ed., 1976). 
